Ad hoc groups, such as peer-to-peer (P2P) systems and mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) represent recent technological advancements. They support low-cost, scalable and fault-tolerant computing and communication. Since such groups do not require any pre-deployed infrastructure or any trusted centralized authority they have many valuable applications in military and commercial as well as in emergency and rescue operations. However, due to lack of centralized control, ad hoc groups are inherently insecure and vulnerable to attacks from both within and outside the group.
Introduction
Ad hoc groups, such as peer-to-peer (P2P) systems and mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), are very popular in today's computing, especially in the research community. They lack infrastructure and do not need any trusted authority. Moreover, they are inherently scalable and fault tolerant. Such characteristics find many interesting applications in military and commercial settings as well as in emergency and rescue operations. However, their open nature and lack of centralized control result in some security challenges.
The security research community recognized the need for specialized security services in ad hoc groups. Access Control is particularly important since most other traditional security are based upon it. In this context, an access control mechanism must prevent unauthorized nodes from becoming a part of the group and to establish trust among members in the absence of a trusted authority. Access control is also essential to bootstrap other security services, such as secure group communication [44, 43] and secure routing (in MANETs), such as Ariadne [17] , SPINS [33] , etc.
The concept of threshold cryptography involves distributing cryptographic primitives (such as decryption and digital signatures) in order to secure them against a corruption of a certain number of parties, i.e., a threshold. For example, a (t À 1, n) threshold signature scheme [6] allows, in a group of a total of n parties, to share the ability to digitally sign messages in such a way that any t parties can do so jointly, whereas no coalition of up to t À 1 parties can.
Related work
Zhou and Haas [45] first suggested using threshold cryptography [45] to secure mobile ad hoc networks. Their intuition was to distribute trust among the nodes of the network such that no less than a certain threshold of nodes are trusted. They proposed a distributed certification authority (CA) [16] which issues certificates (using some threshold signature [6] protocol) to the nodes joining the network. Certificates enable the nodes to communicate with each other in a secure and authenticated manner. This work also led to the development of COCA [46] , an online certification authority for wired networks. Although attractive, this idea is not applicable to ad hoc groups. Their approach is hierarchical: only select nodes can serve as part of the certification authority and thus take part in admission decisions. Moreover, contacting the distributed CA nodes in a MANET setting is difficult since such nodes might be many hops away.
Luo et al. considered the same problem in [23] and Kong et al. in [21, 20] as well as [24, 22] . This body of work proposed a set of protocols for ubiquitous and robust access control in MANETs. They amended the model of Zhou and Haas to allow every member to participate in access control decisions, thus maintaining the true ''peer'' nature of ad hoc groups and providing increased availability. Unfortunately, this otherwise elegant scheme has been shown to be insecure [26, 18] .
Recently, Kim et al. [19] developed a group access control framework based on a menu of cryptographic techniques. This framework classifies group admission policy according to the entity (or entities) making admission decisions. The classification included simple access control policies, such as static ACL (Access Control List)-or attribute-based admission, as well as admission based on the decision of a fixed entity: external (e.g., a CA or a TTP) or internal (e.g., a group founder). Such simple policies are relatively easy to support and do not present much of a technical challenge. However, they are inflexible and ultimately unsuitable for dynamic ad hoc networks. Static ACLs enumerate all possible members and hence cannot support truly dynamic membership (although they work well for closed networks). Admission decisions made by a TTP or a group founder violate the peer nature of the underlying ad hoc group.
In our prior work [37] , we constructed access control mechanisms based on plain RSA signatures and accountable subgroup multisignatures [28] . However, we realize that such mechanisms have lineage problem. This problem occurs when a membership certificate is issued to a new member: each member (sponsor) who takes part in the admission process needs to confirm (by signing) its agreement to admit this new member. Essentially, a membership certificate has to be signed by some number of membership sponsors. 2 However, each sponsor needs to attach its own certificate to its signature on a new member's certificate in order to make group certificates universally verifiable. However, a sponsor's own certificate also has to be countersigned by its erstwhile sponsors, and so on, and so forth. This is clearly unworkable since a member's certificate would have to be accompanied by a number of certificate chains that affirm its lineage.
Our contributions
In this paper, we explore the utility of threshold cryptography (more specifically various existing threshold signatures) in constructing decentralized access control mechanisms for ad hoc groups. We first point out the inapplicability of known threshold RSA signatures towards this goal, and carry on to build access control mechanisms based on various flavors of discrete logarithm based threshold signatures, namely, threshold DSA [11] , threshold Schnorr [12] , and threshold BLS [2] . We compare and evaluate these mechanisms, via theoretical and experimental analysis in a real MANET setting. 3 
Scope
Group access control is a broad topic which includes access control mechanisms and the more general issue of group security policy. This work is concerned only with access control and does not address the specification and negotiation of group security policy. In the following, we assume the existence of such a policy. Furthermore, in an effort to keep our discussion general, we do not consider the impact of the underlying physical-layer characteristics of the ad hoc group. Moreover, although we recognize that proactivity [30, 15, 14] is an important issue to cope up with stronger mobile adversaries, we do not consider it here. However, the threshold signature schemes that we employ have proactive support and the software implementation of the same is left as an avenue for future work.
Our work uses group membership certificates to assert group membership. Certificates, as usual, prompt the revocation headache. However, certificate revocation issues are beyond the scope of this work.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes notations. Section 3 provides the high-level description of the access control protocol. Next, Section 4 discusses inapplicability of known threshold RSA schemes and points out the robustness problem with a recently proposed threshold RSA signature scheme [21] . Sections 5-7 present the proposed access control protocols based on different threshold signature schemes. Then, experimental results are presented and analyzed in Section 8. (Appendix A recalls some cryptographic primitives and Appendix B summarizes the threshold RSA scheme of [21] ).
Notation
Notation used in this paper is summarized in Table 1 . In the rest of the paper, we use the terms member/node/player and group/network/system interchangeably.
Group access control
A threshold signature scheme enables any subgroup of t members in a group to collaboratively sign messages on behalf of that group. This is achieved by secret-sharing the signature key among the group members, and allowing them to compute a signature on some message via a distributed protocol in which the members use the shares of the signature key instead of the key itself. Threshold signature schemes can tolerate up to t À 1 corruptions in the whole lifetime of the system.
The idea of threshold signatures applies directly to build access control mechanisms by making collaborative decisions. Next, we overview a generic access control protocol. Similar to the security model of underlying threshold signature schemes, in our access control mechanisms we consider an adversary who is capable of corrupting at most t À 1 members and tries to come up with an existential forgery under the adaptively chosen message attack model.
The access control mechanism is initiated by a prospective member or an ''applicant''. At the 3 Although in this paper we report only on the experimental evaluation performed in a MANET setting, our access control mechanisms are also generally applicable in various P2P systems. who wishes to join the group must be issued its secret share and membership certificate by current members. Fig. 1 gives a high-level view of group admission protocol.
• P n+1 initiates the admission protocol by sending a JOIN_REQ message to the group. • A member, that receives this JOIN_REQ message and approves the admission of P n+1 , replies, over a secure channel, with a partial secret share and a partial signature derived from its secret share for P n+1 .
• Once P n+1 receives partial shares and signatures from at least t different members, it uses them to compute its secret share and membership certificate.
• Finally, P n+1 verifies the validity of its reconstructed secret share and group membership certificate before using them. Also, when P n+1 detects that its secret share or membership certificate is invalid, it must be able to identify the bogus partial share(s) and/or partial signature(s), and thus trace the malicious group member(s). Note that, this step may involve multiple rounds and/or co-ordination among the members who commit to the requesting member, depending on the underlying cryptographic techniques. 3. Membership authentication: To ensure only genuine members are involved in communication, every member must be able to prove membership to other members.
Threshold RSA schemes
Various flavors of threshold signatures exist in literature: RSA based, DSA based, Schnorr based and more recently, BLS [4] based. However, known provably secure threshold RSA signatures do not yield access control mechanisms for ad hoc groups. In this section, we begin by carefully considering various threshold RSA schemes, explain why they are not applicable for access control in ad hoc groups, and point out the robustness problem with a recently proposed threshold RSA scheme [21, 20, 24, 22] .
Analysis of known schemes
Several threshold RSA signatures are proposed in literature [9, 10, 35, 42, 21, 20, 24, 22] that might be used to construct the group access control protocol. Unfortunately, none of these schemes are directly applicable.
1. Schemes by Frankel et al. and Rabin. The currently known provably secure threshold RSA signature schemes, two schemes by Frankel et al. [9, 10] and a scheme by Rabin [35] , are not applicable for access control in ad hoc groups. In particular, the RSA signature scheme of [9] is practical only for small groups, while in the other two provably secure threshold RSA schemes known today [10, 35] (which employ additive secret sharing as opposed to polynomial secret sharing of [41] ) the members participating in the threshold signature protocol need to reconstruct the secret shares of the group members that are currently inaccessible to them. In this way both protocols essentially equate a temporarily inaccessible group member with a corrupt one, whose secrets might just as well be fabricated. This is an undesirable feature for asynchronous ad hoc groups where members are often inaccessible to one another. In such settings we need to enable isolated but large enough subgroups of members to operate without reconstructing everyone else's secrets. 2. Scheme by Shoup. Another well known and more recent provably secure threshold RSA scheme was proposed by Shoup [42] . This scheme is more elegant than the above ones because the signature generation and verification is fully non-interactive and it also avoids the inaccessibility problem by employing the polynomial (t, n) secret sharing of Shamir [41] . However, since the secret sharing is performed over secret modulo /(N) (unlike over publicly known integers in the schemes discussed above), it is not possible for the group members to provide a new member with its secret share. Moreover, Shoup's scheme requires a trusted dealer to generate the RSA keys, which is an undesirable feature in ad hoc groups. Boneh and Franklin [3] developed a method to generate an RSA modulus in a distributed fashion. Alas, it might not be possible to use this method, since Shoup's scheme requires that the common RSA modulus N be a product of two safe primes. 4 Furthermore, we believe that using any method to generate RSA keys in a distributed manner involves prohibitively high communication and/ or computation overhead which severely impacts the practicality of such techniques in many group setting such as MANETs. 3. Scheme by Kong et al. In an effort to mitigate the above problem of the known threshold RSA signatures, Kong et al. [21] proposed a new threshold RSA scheme, geared toward providing security services in MANETs. Unfortunately, this scheme, contrary to what its authors claimed, is neither robust (i.e., it cannot tolerate malicious group members) nor secure. We first pointed out the robustness problem in [26] . This problem is presented in detail in the following section. We also presented an attack on the scheme in which an admissible threshold of malicious group members can completely recover the RSA secret key in the course of the lifetime of this scheme [18] .
Robustness problem with URSA RSA signature scheme
Recently, Kong et al. in a series of papers [21, 20, 24, 22] proposed a set of protocols for providing ubiquitous and robust access control, so-called URSA, in MANETs without relying on a centralized authority. In this section we argue that this scheme is not robust against malicious adversaries [26] , i.e., it fails to provide the verifiability of partial secret shares ðx ðjÞ nþ1 À sÞ as well as combined secret share (x n+1 ) and the partial signatures (s j À s). As a result, malicious or compromised members can send fake shares and fake signatures to new members without being detected and in turn disrupt the admission service. The reason is as follows:
1. Verifiability of partial secret shares and combined secret share. Since x ðjÞ nþ1 s and x n+1 are computed modulo N and not /(N), it is impossible to verify the correctness using publicly known witnesses. The value of /(N) is known only to the dealer during group initialization and destroyed thereafter. Obviously, group members must not know the value of /(N). Therefore, we cannot apply verifiability mechanisms VPSS and VSS (over modulus N) described in Appendixes A.7 and A.4 to determine the correctness of the partial secret shares and the secret share respectively. In other words,
and
Example. We now provide a trivial example to illustrate the problem. Let us assume that the secret polynomial is f(z) = 77 + 2z + 5z 2 (mod 119), where N = 119 the product of two primes: 7 and 17, and g = 3.
(Note that the degree of the polynomial is 2, hence, the threshold t = 3). The witnesses of f(z), which are publicly known, are as follows: W 0 = 3 77 = 12, W 1 = 3 2 = 9, and W 2 = 3 5 = 5 (mod 119). Suppose a new member P 7 receives the following partial shares from t existing members P 2 , P 3 , and 
Therefore, even though x 7 is correctly computed,
ðmod 119Þ: 2. Verifiability of partial signatures. In case the signature reconstruction fails, P n+1 must verify the correctness of each partial signature s j and trace the faulty signer(s) in the process. This involves a zero knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK) protocol [40] 
ÞÞg between P n+1 and the signer P j . However, due to the reasons explained above, it is impossible to compute W j using the public witness values. Explicitly,
ðmod N Þ ð 3Þ
and therefore, performing the above ZKPK protocol is meaningless. Thus, it is impossible for the prospective member to trace the faulty signer(s).
Threshold DSA based access control
In this section, we describe the access control mechanism (referred to as TS-DSA) [26, 37] based on the threshold DSA scheme [11] of Gennaro et al.
DSA
The DSA [27] is a signature scheme based on the El Gamal signature scheme [7] . In our description of the TS-DSA protocol we follow the notation introduced in [11] , which differs from the original presentation by switching k and k À1 . This change allows a clearer presentation.
1. Key Generation. DSA uses the system-wide parameters (p, q, g) where q is a 160-bit prime number, p is a large prime number such that q divides (p À 1), and g is an element of order q in Z Ã p . Each user selects a random integer x 2 Z q as a private key and computes a public key y such that y = g x (mod p). 2. Signing. To generate a signature on the message m, the signer picks a random number k 2 Z q and calculates r ¼ ðg k À1 ðmod pÞÞ mod q and s = k(m + xr) (mod q). The signature for m is the pair (r, s). 3. Verification. To verify a DSA signature, the verifier computes r 0 ¼ ðg ms À1 y rs À1 ðmod pÞÞ mod q and checks if r 0 = r.
Bootstrapping
TS-DSA can be initialized by either: (1) a trusted dealer or (2) a group of 3t À 2 or more founding members. 5 1. Centralized Initialization. The trusted dealer TD does the following: (a) The TD generates the system parameters (p, q, g), selects a random polynomial f(z) = a 0 + a 1 z + Á Á Á + a tÀ1 z tÀ1 over Z q of degree (t À 1) such that f(0) = a 0 = x where a i s, for i 2 [0, t À 1], are the coefficients of the polynomial and x is a group secret. In order to enable VSS (refer to Appendix A.4) the TD computes and publishes the wit-
. Note that the witness value W 0 = g x , also denoted by y, is actually the group public key. (b) For each P i (i 2 [1, 3t À 2]), the TD computes the secret share x i such that x i = f(id i ) (mod q) and issues the group membership certificate GMC i . Note that the TD is not required hereafter. 2. Decentralized Initialization. A set of founding members P i (i 2 [1, 3t À 2]) do the following: (a) Each P i selects an individual polynomial f i (z) over Z q of degree (t À 1) as in JSS protocol (refer to Appendix A.2).
(b) Then, each P i computes its own secret share x i such that x i ¼ P 3tÀ2 j¼1 f j ðid i Þ mod q. Note that during this process the VSS protocol is applied to check the validity of x i . (c) Now, in order to provide each member with a membership certificate, any set of (2t À 1) founding members must collaborate.
Member admission
Let n (P3t À 2) be the number of current group members. The prospective member P n+1 invokes the admission process described in Section 3. The detailed steps of the protocol are described below. Fig. 2 shows the message flow of the TS-DSA protocol required to obtain GMC n+1 .
1. A prospective member P n+1 broadcasts signed JOIN_REQ 6 message m containing its identity certificate PKC n+1 which contains its public key PK n+1 and identity id n+1 in order to prove the knowledge of the corresponding private key. 7 2. After verifying the signed JOIN_REQ, group members 8 who wish to participate in the admission of P n+1 reply with a signed message 9 containing their respective membership certificates GMC i s which include id i where i 2 [1, t 0 ] and 2t À 1 6 t 0 6 n. 3. P n+1 picks at random (2t À 1) out of t 0 (P2t À 1) sponsors, P j s, collects their id j s from their respective GMC j s to form a sponsor list SL n+1 and replies with a signed acknowledgment message to each of them.
4. Each P j randomly chooses polynomials k j (z) and
, and then distributes k j (id i ) and b j (id i ) to them using JSS protocol. Also, the witness values for these polynomials are broadcast by each P j in order to enable VSS. After receiving the partial shares from other co-signers, P j computes its shares:
, each P j must choose two polynomials [11] . 6. P j computes a partial signature s j = k j (m + x j r) (mod q) and sends it to P n+1 . P j also sends to P n+1 its shuffled partial secret sharex ðjÞ nþ1 for P n+1 using the PSRS protocol (refer to Appendix A.6):x ðmod qÞ and R j is a random share of the shared secret zero. Note that the computation of k j (x) only requires t members. Then, P j computes a pairwise key K jn+1 using the technique in [5] , and sends the encrypted s j andx ðjÞ nþ1 to P n+1 . 7. P n+1 computes the threshold signature s ¼ P 2tÀ1 j¼1 s j k j ð0Þ ðmod qÞ which equals k(m + xr) (mod q). Also, P n+1 computes its own share x n+1 by summing upx ðjÞ nþ1 for j 2 [1, t]. P n+1 verifies the reconstructed signature (r, s) and the reconstructed share x n+1 , using the standard DSA verification and the VSS protocol, respectively. If these verifications succeed, P n+1 creates its membership certificate GMC n+1 which contains m = {id n+1 , PK n+1 , etc.} and its signature (r, s). Otherwise, the technique for tracing malicious members must be employed as follows: , where y j ¼ g x j using the 6 We note that it is necessary to include timestamps, nonces and protocol message identifiers in order to secure the protocol against replay attacks [25] . However, we omit these values to keep our description simple. 7 We assume that there exists an offline CA that issues longterm certificates to each node. In practice, the existence of such a CA can be avoided -a secret channel between the joining node and other nodes can be established by making use of physical out of band channels, as in [36, 13] . Of course, this way of establishing secret channels would require more overhead and some user involvement. 8 We note that multiple sponsors may reply in parallel. 9 Note that how to provide authenticity of protocol messages is implementation-dependent. Here, the signature can be replaced with a message authentication code (MAC) [25] , provided that Diffie-Hellman key exchange is available.
witnesses for VSS as in [5] and g k À1 j is computed as v u À1 j j from the steps (2) and (5) in Fig. 2 . If either of the above tracing functions fail, P n+1 concludes that P j is cheating.
Membership authentication
Every legitimate member is able to prove its membership using its own membership certificate. This involves a verifier sending a challenge to the group member, and the group member responding back with a signed challenge along with its membership certificate. The verifier first verifies the DSA signature on the certificate (using the public key of the group) and then the signature on the challenge (using the group member's public key extracted from its membership certificate).
Threshold Schnorr based access control
In this section, we describe the access control mechanism (referred to as TS-Sch) based on the threshold Schnorr scheme [12] . 
Schnorr signature scheme
The Schnorr signature scheme [39] is a variant of the El Gamal scheme and its security is based on the DL assumptions [34] .
1. Key generation. The method to generate keys is the same as DSA key generation, except that there are no constraints on the sizes of p and q. 2. Signing. To generate a signature, the signer selects a random secret integer k 2 Z q , computes r = g k mod p, e = H(mkr), and s = k À ex mod q. The pair (e, s) is the signature of the message m. 3. Verification. To verify a signature, the verifier computes r 0 = g s y e mod p and e 0 = H(mkr 0 ) and accepts the signature if and only if e 0 = e.
Bootstrapping
TS-Sch can be initialized in the same way as TS-DSA, except the minimum number of founding members required for decentralized initialization is (2t À 1).
Member admission
Let n (P2t À 1) be the number of current group members. The protocol steps are described below and in Fig. 3. 1. Same as the step (1) in Section 5.3. 2. Each P i (i 2 [1, t 0 ]) where t 6 t 0 6 n, who participates in the admission of P n+1 randomly chooses k i in Z q , computes r i such that r i ¼ g ki ðmod pÞ, and then replies with a signed message containing r i and GMC i . 3. P n+1 picks at random t out of t 0 (Pt) sponsors, P j s and collects id j s from the respective GMC j s to form a sponsor list SL n+1 . Also, P n+1 computes r ¼ Q t j¼1 r j ðmod pÞ and e = H(mkr). Then, P n+1 replies with a signed acknowledgment message containing e, SL n+1 to each of the t members. 4. Each P j then computes the partial signature s j and the shuffled partial secret sharex ðjÞ nþ1 such that s j = k j + ex j (mod q) andx ðjÞ nþ1 ¼ x j k j ðid nþ1 Þþ R j k j ð0Þ ðmod qÞ. Then P j sends s j andx ðjÞ nþ1 to P n+1 over secure channel with K jn+1 as in the step (6) in Section 5.3. 
Membership authentication
Same as described in Section 5.4, except that the signature on the certificate is verified using Schnorr signature verification.
Threshold BLS based access control
We now describe the access control mechanism (referred to as TS-BLS 10 ) based on the threshold BLS [4] scheme of [2] .
BLS signature scheme
Boneh et al. [4] proposed a short signature scheme (referred to as BLS). BLS uses the systemwide parameters ðp; F p ; a; b; P ; qÞ based on Elliptic Curves (EC). The curve is represented by a equation: y 2 = x 3 + ax + b. G 1 is set to be a group of order q generated by P, G 2 is a subgroup of F Ã p 2 of order q, andê : G 1 Â G 1 ! G 2 is defined to be a public bilinear mapping, satisfyingêðaP ; bQÞ 1 eðP ; QÞ ab and non-degeneracy,êðP ; P Þ 6 ¼> 1 for all a; b 2 Z Ã q and P ; Q 2 G 1 . Also, H 1 : f0; 1g Ã ! G 1 is the hash function that maps binary strings to nonzero points in G 1 . All of this information is published. In brief, the BLS signature scheme operates as follows:
1. Key generation. Pick random x 2 Z Ã q and compute Q = xP. x is the private key and Q is the corresponding public key.
2.
Signing. To sign a message m, compute s = xH 1 (m), where H 1 is a special hash function that maps binary strings onto points in G 1 . s is the signature on m. 3. Verification. Given (P, Q, m, s), check ifêðQ; H 1 ðmÞÞ ¼êðP ; sÞ.
Bootstrapping
Similar to TS-DSA and TS-Sch, TS-BLS can be initialized by either: (1) a trusted dealer or (2) a group of (2t À 1) or more founding members. The bootstrapping procedure is exactly the same as in TS-DSA. Only difference is that the VSS operations are performed in the elliptic curve domain and threshold BLS signing is used to issue certificates.
Member admission
Let n (P2t À 1) be the number of current group members. The protocol steps are described below and Fig. 4 shows the protocol message flow.
Same as the step (1) in Section 5.3. 2. Group members who participate in admission
reply with their respective GMC i s to P n+1 along with its signature. 3. P n+1 picks t out of t 0 (Pt) sponsors, forms a list SL n+1 which contains the ids of t sponsors, signs it, and sends it to each P j . 4. Each sponsoring member computes the partial signature s j and the shuffled partial share of the secretx ðjÞ nþ1 such that s j = x j H 1 (m) andx
ðmod qÞ. Note that, unlike TS-DSA and TS-Sch, s j is computed without Lagrange coefficient k j (0) which means that TS-BLS signing does not require any interaction among t sponsoring members. 5. P n+1 first computes the signature s and its share x n+1 such that s ¼ P t j¼1 s j k j ð0Þ ¼ P t j¼1 ðx j k j ð0ÞÞ H 1 ðmÞ ¼ xH 1 ðmÞ and x nþ1 ¼ P t j¼1x ðjÞ nþ1 ðmod qÞ. P n+1 verifies the signature s using normal BLS verification. Also, P n+1 verifies x n+1 using the following ECC-version of VSS protocol such that
If it succeeds, P n+1 creates its membership certificate GMC n+1 which contains m = {id n+1 , PK n+1 , etc.} and s. If verification fails, P n+1 traces s j andx ðjÞ nþ1 using techniques presented in the following: (a) Partial share tracing. Correctness of partial secret sharex ðjÞ nþ1 can be checked using 10 The identity-based version of this scheme appeared in [38] .
the following ECC-version of the VPSS technique:x
Partial signature tracing. Correctness of each partial signature s j can be verified bŷ eðs j ; P Þ ¼êðH 1 ðmÞ; k j ð0Þ P tÀ1 i¼0 id i j W i Þ.
Membership authentication
Same as described in Section 5.4, except that the signature on the certificate is verified using BLS signature verification.
Performance evaluation
In this section, we compares the three access control mechanisms, TS-DSA, TS-Sch, and TS-BLS, in terms of their respective key features and their performance. Table 2 summarizes the key features of each mechanism. In TS-DSA, (2t À 1) signers are required to tolerate (t À 1) faults, while t partial shares are needed to reconstruct the secret share for joining. Both TS-Sch and TS-BLS schemes require t partial signatures as well as t partial shares. Thus, to complete admission protocol, the group population should be at least (2t À 1) in TS-Sch and TS-BLS protocols, and (3t À 2) in TS-DSA. Both TS-DSA and TS-Sch require, by construction, the generation of a random value (and in turn interaction) among sponsors, while TS-BLS has a fully non-interactive signature generation. Table 3 compares computation and communication costs of the three protocols 11 . As with computation costs, for admission, TS-DSA and TS-Sch require O(t 2 ) exponentiations. TS-BLS requires O(t 2 ) M operations (which are computationally equivalent to modula exponentiations in finite fields) and 2 P operations. For traceability, TS-DSA and TS-Sch schemes require O(t 2 ) exponentiations, while TS-BLS requires O(t 2 ) M and 2t P operations. This means that TS-DSA and TS-Sch should perform better than TS-BLS as far as Fig. 4 . TS-BLS admission protocol. 11 The costs required for protecting each protocol message are not taken into account since these costs vary with the specific signature scheme. traceability is concerned. For membership authentication, both TS-DSA and TS-Sch requires 2 exponentiations. On the other hand, TS-BLS requires 2 P operations.
Complexity comparison
In terms of overall communication costs, all protocols require at least O(t 2 ) unicasts and consume O(t 2 log q + t log p) bits. However, we observe that TS-DSA requires significantly more rounds and higher bandwidth.
Experimental setups
We now describe the experimental testbeds for measuring the performance of our proposed protocols. We ran experiments in a real wireless MANET environment and also measured energy costs for each scheme with power measuring system below.
Wireless mobile ad hoc networks
We used five laptop computers for our wireless experimental set-up: four laptop computers with Pentium-3 800 MHz CPU and 256 MB memory and one laptop computer with Mobile Pentium 1.8 GHz CPU and 512 MB memory. Each machine is configured with 802.11b in ad hoc mode and runs the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) [29] . Each machine runs Linux kernel 2.4. To simulate more than five nodes using just five laptops, we ran more than one client process on each laptop. 8.2.1.1. Effect of mobility. Node mobility certainly affects the performance of our access control mechanisms. Clearly, if nodes move around (and become unreachable to each other and to the joining node) while the protocol is in execution, the protocol might not terminate successfully. On the other hand, mobility can help the joining node to move to a new, more dense location, where it has enough neighbors to sponsor its admission.
In our experimental evaluation to follow, we did not include the affect of mobility due to the following reason: our evaluation measures the protocol (computation, communication, power) overhead under the assumption that the protocol successfully terminates, i.e., under the assumption that the joining node has enough online neighbors available for the duration the protocol is executed. In other words, we assume that the nodes who sponsor admission do not move around (and become unreachable to each other and to the joining node) during the execution of the protocol.
Power measurement systems
To measure consumption of battery power, we configured the following equipment, as shown in Fig. 5 . The test machine was an iPAQ (model H5555) running Linux (Familiar-0.7.2). The CPU Table 3 Computation and communication complexities on the iPAQ is a 400 MHz Intel XScale with 48MB of flash memory and 128MB of SDRAM. In order to obtain accurate power measurements, we removed the battery from the iPAQ during the experiment and placed a resistor in series with power supply. We used a National Instruments PCI DAQ (Data AcQuisition) board to sample the voltage drops across the resistor to calculate the current at 1000 samples per second.
Test methodology
1. Parameter selection. To perform fair comparisons, the size of the parameter q was set to be 160-bit and p to be 1024-bit except for TS-BLS. For TS-BLS experiments, we used the elliptic curve E defined by the equation: y 2 = x 3 + 1 over F p with p > 3 a prime satisfying p = 2 (mod) 3 and q being a prime factor 12 of p + 1. The parameter p is a 512-bit prime in order to make sure that the security of pairingê is equivalent to the security as in finite field of 1024 bits. 13 The measurements were performed with different threshold values t from 1 to 9. We used 1024-bit RSA signature with the fixed public exponent 65537 (= 2 16 + 1) for protocol message authentication. All experiments were repeated 1000 times for each measurement in order to get fairly accurate average results. 14 2. Test cases. We measured the respective costs of admission, energy consumption (of admission), traceability, and membership authentication.
Basic operations
We first present the costs of the primitive operations in Table 4 . For measuring the costs of basic operations, we used a machine with Mobile Pentium 1.8 GHz CPU and 512 MB memory.
Experimental results
We now present and discuss the performance measurement results for the proposed TS-DSA, TS-Sch and TS-BLS schemes. Fig. 6a shows the admission cost with varying threshold for TS-DSA, TS-Sch and TS-BLS schemes. The admission costs also include the verification of the membership certificate and the secret share.
Admission results
As shown in Fig. 6a , TS-BLS exhibits appreciably better performance that TS-DSA. The results imply that the amount of communication in TS-DSA 12 By Euler's theorem, q must divide #EðF p Þ. For the curve y 2 = x 3 + 1, #EðF p Þ ¼ p þ 1. 13 The G 1 is a subgroup of points generated by P such that P 2 EðF p Þ. The G 2 is a subgroup of F Ã p 2 of order q. The bilinear mapê : G 1 Â G 1 ! G 2 is the well-known Tate pairing. Computing discrete log in F p 2 is sufficient for computing discrete log in G 1 . Therefore, for proper security of discrete log in F p 2 the prime p should be at least 512-bits long (so that the group size is at least 1024-bits long).
14 The source code is publicly available at [32] .
contributes significantly to the overall cost of admission, although computation-wise it is still quite efficient (see Table 3 ).
Energy consumption results
This experiment is quite tricky to measure fairly. The energy consumption is directly proportional to the processing time and thus it is meaningless to measure energy consumption with all the test cases above. However, it is well known that, in many small devices such as low-end MANET nodes or sensors, sending a single bit is roughly equivalent to performing 1000 32-bit computations in terms of batter power consumption [1] . Therefore, we measured power consumption in terms of communication bandwidth required by each admission protocol. For more details, we sent some bulk data (e.g., 100 Mbytes) from a single iPAQ PDA (refer to Fig. 5 ), measured power consumed while sending out this data, and then computed the average power consumption per bit. After that, we calculated power consumption of each admission protocol by multiplying this measurement result by the bit length of the transmitted data.
Energy consumption results are plotted in Fig. 6b . These results clearly illustrate that TS-BLS is the most energy-efficient, since they require the smallest amount of bandwidth amongst the respective admission protocols. 
Traceability results
Traceability costs are presented in Fig. 6c . Due to the costly computation of Tate pairings, TS-BLS performs poorly, as compared to TS-DSA and TSSch. However, since the misbehavior in the admission protocol leads ultimately to the eviction of the corresponding group member, we argue that traceability is a rare exceptional measure; thus we consider its costs to be relatively unimportant.
Membership authentication results
The costs of membership authentication are shown in Fig. 6d . The results show that costs for TS-DSA and TS-Sch are very close to each other and relatively constant while TS-BLS cost is very high due to expensive pairing operation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the utility of various existing threshold signature schemes in building distributed access control mechanisms for ad hoc groups. We first showed that none of the threshold (or proactive) RSA signature schemes in the literature are applicable for our purpose. Next, we implemented three access control mechanisms based on discrete-logarithm based threshold signatures, threshold DSA (TS-DSA), threshold Schnorr (TS-Sch) and threshold BLS (TS-BLS), and evaluated them in a real MANET setting. Based on our evaluation, we conclude that overall TS-Sch is the most efficient mechanism, followed by TS-BLS and TS-DSA.
Appendix A. Cryptographic primitives

A.1. Threshold secret sharing (TSS)
In this section, we present Shamir's secret sharing scheme [41] which is based on polynomial interpolation. We will refer to it as TSS. To distribute shares of a secret x among n entities, a trusted dealer TD chooses a polynomial f(z) over Z q of degree ðt À 1Þ : f ðzÞ ¼ P tÀ1 i¼0 a i z i ðmod qÞ, where the constant term a 0 is set to the group secret x; f(0) = a 0 = x. TD computes each entity's share x i such that x i = f(id i ), where id i is an identifier of entity P i , and securely transfers x i to P i . Note that after distributing at least t secret shares, the dealer is no longer required.
Then, any group of t entities who have their shares can recover the secret using the Lagrange interpolation formula: f ðzÞ ¼ P t i¼1 x i k i ðzÞ ðmod qÞ, where k i ðzÞ ¼ Q t j¼1;j6 ¼i zÀidj idiÀidj ðmod qÞ. Since f(0) = x, the shared secret may be expressed as: x ¼ f ð0Þ ¼ P t i¼1 x i k i ð0Þ ðmod qÞ. Thus, the secret x can be recovered only if at least t shares are combined. In other words, no coalition of less than t entities yields any information about x.
A.2. Joint secret sharing (JSS)
This scheme (due to Pederson [31] ), denoted by JSS, extends Shamir's secret sharing by removing the need for a centralized dealer to choose a polynomial and distribute shares. In this scheme, the entities collectively choose shares corresponding to Shamir's secret sharing of a random value without the dealer. The main idea here is that the polynomial itself is shared such that f(z) = f 1 (z) + Á Á Á + f n (z), where f i (z) is the polynomial of each entity P i over Z q .
Suppose there are n entities in a system (P 1 , . . . , P n ). It will be assumed that all entities of the group have previously agreed on the prime q. Each P i chooses at random a polynomial f i ðzÞ 2 Z q of degree (t À 1) such that f i (0) = r i where r i is a random secret that P i selects. Let f i (z) = a i0 + a i1 z + Á Á Á + a i,tÀ1 z tÀ1 (mod q), where a i0 = r i . P i computes P j 's sharex
, and securely sends it to P j (in particular P i keepŝ x ðiÞ i ). Note that the share values should be transmitted over the secure channel. P j computes its share x j of the secret x as the sum of all shares received:
It is given by: f(z) = f 1 (z) + Á Á Á + f n (z) (mod q). By construction x j = f(id j ) for j 2 [1, n], and therefore x j is a share of x such that
Once every entity has its own share, any coalition of t entities can jointly recover the secret x using Lagrange interpolation as in TSS in Appendix A.1.
A.3. Joint zero secret sharing (JZSS)
This scheme, which first appeared in [15] , is a variant of joint secret sharing where the shared secret is zero. In other words, this scheme is the same as JSS except that in first step, each entity picks a random (t À 1)-degree polynomial f i ðzÞ 2 Z q such that f i (0) = 0. We refer to it as a Joint Zero Secret Sharing, denoted by JZSS. It is used in proactive secret sharing and partial share random shuffling for re-randomizing a secret share.
A.4. Verifiable secret sharing (VSS)
If we suppose that some entities can become malicious or compromised by an adversary, they may attempt to ''cheat'' by using incorrect secret shares in order to deny/disrupt the service. To remedy the situation, a more advanced technique, Verifiable Secret Sharing [8] , denoted by VSS, can be used. It basically provides a means to detect incorrect secret shares. To be more specific, VSS setup involves two large primes p and q, and an element g 2 Z Ã p chosen in a way that q divides p À 1 and g is an element of Z Ã p which has order q. The procedure for the TD to distribute the shares is the same as in Appendix A.1. VSS is achieved by the following procedure:
1. Witness generation. The TD randomly selects a polynomial f ðzÞ ¼ P tÀ1 i¼0 a i z i , computes secret shares x i , and transfers them to each entity securely. Also, TD chooses an element g 2 Z 
A.5. Partial secret sharing (PSS)
As a result of secret sharing, each honest entity P i obtains a secret share x i . Then, the share x n+1 for a prospective entity P n+1 can be computed through collaboration of t existing entities in the group when the TD is no longer available. We call this a Partial Secret Share, referring it to as PSS. P n+1 receives t partial shares x ðjÞ nþ1 s from a set of t entities called sponsors. It will be assumed that the t number of indices, j (= 1, . . . , t), are given to each P j by P n+1 . The details are as follows: each P j computes a partial secret share for P n+1 as: x ðjÞ nþ1 ¼ x j Á k j ðid nþ1 Þ ðmod pÞ, where x j is P j 's own secret share. Then, P j securely sends x ðjÞ nþ1 to P n+1 . Given t partial shares and an identity of P n+1 , the secret share x n+1 can be computed: x nþ1 ¼ P t j¼1 x ðjÞ nþ1 ¼ P t j¼1 x j Á h k j ðid nþ1 Þ i ðmod qÞ. Recall that f ðzÞ ¼ P t i¼1 x i k i ðzÞ and x n+1 = f(id n+1 ).
A.6. Partial share random shuffling (PSRS)
In PSS the above, P n+1 needs to be provided (in a distributed manner) with its share x n+1 of the group secret x. However, in case that each sponsor P j issues P n+1 a partial secret share x ðjÞ nþ1 such that x ðjÞ nþ1 ¼ x j kðid nþ1 Þ, P n+1 (or an adversary who corrupts P n+1 ) can easily recover each x j and in turn the group secret x, since Lagrange coefficients k j (id n+1 ) are publicly known, P n+1 can obtain x j by dividing x ðjÞ nþ1 by k j (id n+1 ). To remedy this, P j s must randomize the issued partial shares. We call this procedure as Partial Share Random Shuffling, denoted by PSRS.
The detailed procedure is as follows. All of the t sponsors perform the JZSS, as in Appendix A.3, by setting the constant term of their respective polynomials to zero. Also, the witness values of the polynomials are broadcast to enable VSS. At the end of JZSS, every P j possesses a random share R j of the shared secret zero. Now, P j provides the shuffled partial secret sharex ðjÞ nþ1 for P nþ1 :x ðjÞ nþ1 ¼ x ðjÞ nþ1 þ R j k j ð0Þ ¼ x j k j ðid nþ1 Þ þ R j k j ð0Þ ðmod qÞ. Since P t j¼1 R j k j ð0Þ¼ 0, P n+1 's secret share x n+1 is given by x nþ1 ¼ P tÀ1 j¼0x ðjÞ nþ1 .
A.7. Verifiable partial secret sharing (VPSS)
The idea of VSS can be easily extended to verify correctness of partial shares that P n+1 receives from sponsors. We call this a Verifiable Partial Secret Sharing, referred to as VPSS. Sincex ðjÞ nþ1 ¼ x j k j ðid nþ1 Þþ R j k j ð0Þ where R j is the random number for the PSRS technique as explained above, to check ifx Appendix B. Threshold RSA scheme of [23, 21, 20, 24, 22] A TD is involved in a one-time setup to bootstrap the system. TD generates the standard RSA private/ public key pair, i.e., it picks two random primes p and q, sets N = pq, sets (e, N) as a public key where gcd(e, N) = 1, and as a private key it sets a number d < N s.t. ed = 1 mod /(N). Once the standard RSA key pair is chosen, TD secret-shares the RSA secret key d using a slight modification of TSS. Namely, TD selects a random polynomial f(z) = a 0 + a 1 z + Á Á Á + a t z t over Z N of degree t, such that the group secret is f(0) = d (mod N). Next, TD gives to each member P i , for i = 1,. . . ,n, a secret share x i = f(id i ) (mod N). Notice that the secret d is shared over a public composite modulus N as opposed to a prime modulus as in the original scheme of Shamir and a secret modulus /(N) in Shoup's scheme. Since there may be compromised members who can generate false shares and false signatures thereafter, the dealer provides a witness of f(z) which is represented by fg a 0 ; g a 1 ; . . . ; g a tÀ1 gðmod N Þ for a certain g 2 Z Ã N , and publishes it for VSS [8] . Fig. 7 shows the message flows for the admission protocol. Each member P j , for id j 2 SL n+1 , outputs its partial signature s j on m as s j ¼ m dj ðmod N Þ, where d j = x j k j (0) (mod N). In addition, P j also provides P n+1 with its partial secret sharex ðjÞ nþ1 (computed over modulus N) after shuffling using PSRS. P n+1 reconstructs the RSA signature using the tbounded offsetting algorithm (refer to [21] for details) and its secret share x n+1 such that x nþ1 ¼ P idj2SL nþ1x ðjÞ nþ1 ðmod N Þ.
